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Calculating Risk, Denying Uncertainty: 
Seismicity and Hydropower Development in Nepal
If Ulrich Beck’s definition of ‘risk society’ 
describes societies increasingly structured 
by preoccupations with future environmental 
threats and related insecurities created by 
modernization, then Nepal’s hydropower 
community would appear to be quite the 
opposite, propelled into environmental denial 
by twin demands for domestic electricity and 
revenue earned through hydroelectric export. 
Our research reveals that prior to the April 
2015 earthquake in Nepal, the hydropower 
community was engaging in what Eviatar 
Zerubavel calls ‘socially organized denial,’ 
largely ignoring the uncertainties associated 
with seismic activity. Earthquakes and tremors 
were viewed as unavoidable realities that 
should not impede hydropower development. 
This denial, we argue, was shaped not only 
by local political realities and demand for 
electricity, but also by a larger desire to 
capitalize on available funds from international 
finance, which are highly contingent upon Nepal 
presenting itself as a ‘safe’ zone for investment. 
Our study focuses on the elites of Nepal’s hydro 
community: the developers, investors, water 
experts, and government officials who occupy 
the ‘upstream’ positions at which scientific 
knowledge is produced and adjudicated. On 
one hand, the denial or omission of earthquake 
potential that we witnessed seems to identify 
the ineluctable challenges that Nepal faces 
in attempting to integrate its economy into 
global markets; on the other hand, it indicates 
the desire of the private sector to reap 
profits from hydropower in spite of obvious 
geophysical dangers. These dangers, we 
argue, are a bankable risk for these elites. 
However, for the people directly affected by 
new hydropower infrastructures, these are 
risks and uncertainties threatening already 
vulnerable livelihoods.
Keywords: seismicity, hydropower, infrastructure, uncertainty, 
financialization of risk, Nepal.
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Introduction
The Nepal April 2015 earthquake devastated infrastructure 
in the middle third of the country. It rendered many roads, 
paths, bridges, and hillsides structurally unsafe for use or 
habitation. Several hydropower plants were also knocked 
off-line—a staggering blow for a country already contend-
ing with year-round load shedding, and needing reliable 
energy to fuel its reconstruction efforts.
Given the country’s deep-seated aspirations for hydro-
power as a future pathway to development (Butler 2016; 
Lord 2014; Rest 2012), analyses of the damage to existing 
plants and those under construction quickly emerged. 
The Nepal Electricity Authority reported that 150MW 
(megawatts) of electricity generation had been lost in 
the earthquake from a national portfolio of just 774MW 
(Pangeni 2015), and that this loss represented an ‘acutely 
small level of…capacity in a nation of 28 million people’ 
(Schneider 2015). Furthermore, several projects in devel-
opment were set back months and years due to road 
devastation, project repair needs, and construction mate-
rials being diverted to other post-quake reconstruction 
needs, such as shelters, roads, hospitals, and schools. “This 
is a huge setback to Nepal,” Ram Siwakoti from Chilime 
Hydropower told the Nepali Times, “[W]e will need a lot of 
time and money to recover fully” (Rai 2015). Khadga Bisht, 
president of the Independent Power Producers Association 
of Nepal (IPPAN), called the earthquake, “[t]he most devas-
tating blow to Nepal’s energy sector after the Maoist war” 
(ibid).
As the Nepali government and development agencies 
continued to tally earthquake damage and future losses, 
the hydropower community generated its own assess-
ments (IPPAN 2015). In the months following the disaster, 
quake-induced landslides followed, exacerbating the 
already-sluggish efforts to restore hydropower plants. 
Project officials at the Bhote Kosi project, a 45MW plant, 
estimated its generation losses at 2,36GWh (gigawatt 
hours), or $30 million (Pangeni 2016). Six months after the 
earthquake, the government’s long-awaited Post-Disaster 
Needs Assessment reported total energy sector losses 
approaching NRs. 18.75 billion—or $178.5 million—and an 
energy shortfall of 93MW by the start of 2016 (Giri 2015).
For the first time in decades, the earthquake and its 
after-effects ushered doubt into discussions about the 
viability of large-scale hydropower in Nepal and its ability 
to buoy the economic prospects of the nation. Since the 
government opened the hydro sector to private interests 
in 1992, hydro professionals have battled vociferously 
for a business milieu with qualities common to private 
sectors in nations around the world: low regulation, 
investment-friendly tax rates, and expedited processes 
for socio-environmental approval of projects (Butler 
2016). But the earthquake had given weight to a host 
of associated concerns, all of which would complicate 
hydro-constructions even further: glacial lake outburst 
floods (ICIMOD 2011) and the increased likelihood of land-
slides (Rai 2016).
To some Nepalis, this new reflexivity on the safety of 
hydropower was long overdue (Thapa & Shrestha 2015). 
But to others, the idea that serious doubt would suddenly 
re-enter conversations about hydro-futures, seemed 
delinquent and incongruous with the stated aim of 
turning Nepal into a ‘hydropower nation’ (Lord 2014). To 
investigate these contradictory perspectives on hydro-
power and seismicity, we draw on six years of fieldwork 
in hydropower development in Nepal, including detailed 
examinations of the private sector, and attending hydro-
power-related conferences, seminars, and presentations 
at government institutions, private hydropower company 
headquarters, and civil society-sponsored events. We have 
each—together and separately—conducted interviews with 
more than 80 private sector hydropower representatives 
regarding their attitudes and opinions about hydropower, 
Nepali economic development, the environmental and 
economic impacts of hydropower, and seismicity. What we 
have learned through these interactions is that our inter-
locutors work hard to render seismicity as a calculable risk 
while denying the inherently uncertain character of their 
calculations. Through this move, we argue, large-scale 
hydropower development in Nepal becomes a business 
option. At the same time, it brackets out the fact that 
people living in close proximity to these future hydro-
power sites will have no devices at hand to calculate the 
risks emanating from them, and will encounter growing 
levels of uncertainty when it comes to the ramifications of 
seismic activity.
“You just accept the risk.”
At the 2013 IPPAN Power Summit in Kathmandu, Nepali 
military in drab green uniforms ringed the large ballroom 
at the Soaltee Hotel. Men in business suits socialized over 
coffee and tea, waiting for Nepal’s interim president, Ram 
Baran Yadav. And then the ballroom went dark—the first 
of seven power cuts for the day. The fact that this was a 
hydropower conference couldn’t have made the irony any 
thicker. After President Yadav and other ministers arrived 
on stage, the crowd sat through a morning of benedictory 
wishes from the Nepali government, the country repre-
sentatives of well-known lending institutions, and a few 
foreign diplomats. Each speaker told the audience that the 
future of Nepal depended on hydropower development.
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In the afternoon, the head of an interest group speak-
ing for private hydro developers addressed the crowd, 
stressing the need to create ‘bankable’ projects that would 
appear ‘friendly’ to foreign companies and assure them 
of profitable returns on investment. But the prospect of 
improved electricity and infrastructure for Nepal, he said, 
was only half the story. If Nepal could capitalize on its 
6,000 rivers, hydro development could move the entire 
country out of its ‘developing’ status, and, by virtue of free 
markets, signal the fulfillment of the democratic principles 
first pursued during the Jan Andolan movement in 1990. 
His remarks were met with vigorous applause, and he con-
cluded his presentation with a quote ascribed to Confucius: 
“Set the goal right, but if it can’t be reached, don’t adjust 
the goal. Hasten the pace.”
The topic of risk—a specific type of risk—dominated the 
proceedings. A morning roundtable on the financial via-
bility of hydropower projects discussed ‘acceptable risk 
allocation’ and ‘sovereign risk,’ which were the risk factors 
foreign investors would have to anticipate in an environ-
ment in which their investments would not necessarily be 
covered by the same legal protections they could expect at 
home. Then there were slideshows on commercial risks for 
domestic developers, including currency fluctuations and 
market variability on fuel prices and construction mate-
rials. Finally, another presenter summarized the project 
risks in terms of cost overruns, worker performance, and 
the availability of heavy construction machinery.
Beneath the surface of this roundtable, and many other 
presentations from the conference, lingered a perceptible 
anguish that felt like blame—blame on the Nepali govern-
ment, and, in particular, the Nepal Electricity Authority 
(NEA), the country’s parastatal responsible for electricity 
generation, transmission, and distribution. When NEA’s 
director presented his energy demand forecasts to the 
audience, he sought to temper their claims and expecta-
tions by saying the free market itself was unpredictable 
in terms of risk, a remark that drew a long line of angry 
business people to the microphone for the Q&A. No, they 
argued, the free market was the solution: it would dis-
tribute risk in a way that would stimulate production and 
provide benefits for people in Nepal. They argued that 
it was the government who inhibited this process. The 
country head of the Asian Development Bank told the 
audience that mitigation of risk should not be the private 
developer’s burden.
Away from the conference scene, our interviews with 
private hydro professionals also revealed a surprising 
lack of acknowledgment of the potential for earthquakes 
to pose a serious threat to the country. When questioned 
directly about seismicity concerns, most respondents 
bracketed seismic risk apart as an unpredictable, and thus 
negligible, externality. As one developer put it, “Natural 
calamities can happen anywhere. You just accept the risk.” 
A few years earlier, in conversation with an Indian hydro-
power engineer who was preparing one of the major new 
foreign-funded projects in Nepal, one of us asked about 
the danger of a dam failure caused by an earthquake. He 
replied: “This is a silly question. All the components will be 
defined on the basis of earthquake risks.” That was that.
And yet, as quickly as a developer dismissed questions 
about seismic risk, they would also vouch for the unpre-
dictability of rivers. One respondent admitted that he 
was concerned with the number of dams proposed for 
construction in the case of seismic activity: “I’ve spent 35 
years on these rivers… You always have that risk… they 
are unpredictable.” A second developer told us, “The 
Himalayas are young mountains and still have a lot of 
motion in their formation.” But when asked if he thought 
Nepal should curb its aspirations for hydro development, 
he dismissed the notion because time was of the essence: 
“If we don’t build hydropower now, India will build its own 
and no longer need electricity from [Nepal].” So, how do 
we explain this disjuncture between earthquake awareness 
and lack of preparedness, particularly, for our purposes, in 
the hydropower sector? How did these equally central dis-
cursive themes move in parallel for so long? Interviewed 
by Spotlight Nepal, Bigyan Shrestha, CEO for the Upper 
Tamakoshi Hydroelectric Project made this admission:
Just parroting the lessons of 1934 earthquake and 
focusing in Kathmandu alone would not be enough. 
The situation has changed a lot in the last eight 
decades. There are many hydropower projects, 
road projects and other infrastructures close to epi-
centers and seismically vulnerable areas. So far as 
hydropower plants are concerned, mountains and 
Himalayan foothills are considered as good sites 
because rocks are strong and good in these areas. 
Thus, these areas have now turned into hub[s] for 
hydropower. Before [the] April 25 earthquake, no 
one had made an exact calculation on how earth-
quakes would damage these projects. Nepal lies in a 
seismically active zone, particularly the Himalayas 
and hills, we need to seriously study seismic vulner-
abilities of the region before taking the projects. 
(Shrestha 2015)
Indeed, our own research echoes Mr. Shrestha’s point. 
Having conducted hundreds of interviews with hydro-pro-
fessionals and politicians for the past six years in Nepali 
and English, we have noted a lack of concern expressed by 
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this group regarding the earthquake potential. Discussions 
about seismicity risks were rare, and, when discussed 
at all, commonly bracketed as an uncontrollable neg-
ative externality that could not and should not deter 
hydro development.
Caught Unawares?
The idea of the ‘Big One’ has been a long-running exis-
tential threat in Nepali discourse since the 8.0 magnitude 
Nepal-Bihar earthquake in 1934 that killed an estimated 
11,000 people. And the general seismicity of Nepal is also a 
largely accepted truth, supported by the country’s various 
policies, plans, and programs dedicated to disaster pre-
paredness and risk reduction. These include the Natural 
Calamity Relief Act of 1982, the Nepal Risk Reduction 
Consortium formed in 2009, and the Kathmandu Valley 
Earthquake Risk Management Project. That the April 25 
earthquake occurred on a Saturday likely saved thousands 
of lives because school was not in session and that morning 
many Nepali were outdoors enjoying the spring weather. 
That the diminished loss of life was owed to any sort of 
preparation on the part of the Nepali government and its 
many multinational supporters was generally discounted 
(Sharma 2015; Useem, Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan 2015).
Considering the current state of hydropower generation 
in Nepal, it might be surprising to learn that in Nepal 
electricity production started in 1911, more than 100 years 
ago, with a 500 kW (kilowatt) hydropower plant on the 
outskirts of Kathmandu. The fact that the second plant 
was not built until 1934 shows that feudal elites of the time 
did not see electricity as a means to increase productivity. 
Instead, they regarded it as a luxury item, primarily used 
to generate power for lighting their palaces in downtown 
Kathmandu (Gyawali 2003: 72). To this day—at least in 
people’s imagination—access to electricity remains closely 
related to access to political and economic power.
The arrival of post-World War II (WWII) aid in the region 
did not expedite hydropower generation in Nepal in the 
same ways as it did in other parts of the region, like India 
and Pakistan. A World Bank report from 1964 stated that 
only the cities of Kathmandu and Biratnagar enjoyed 
a regular electricity supply, and that only one-fifth of 
the national generating capacity of 10 MW came from 
hydropower. After an additional 20 MW of hydropower 
production was slated for commission in the late 1960s, 
the World Bank authors reasoned that, ‘there seems to 
be no need for any other major additions to generat-
ing capacity for the time being’ (World Bank 1964: 32). 
This attitude towards electricity production has been a 
long-standing complaint voiced by many of our interloc-
utors in the hydro sector who blame the Bank’s decades 
of conservative forecast projections for the long delay in 
hydropower production.
While the World Bank report underestimated (by today’s 
needs) the potential for hydropower consumption in 
Nepal, it did recognize the need for an improved insti-
tutional arrangement of electricity production and 
distribution. Eventually, and with strong support from 
the Bank, the government created the Nepal Electricity 
Authority (NEA) in 1985 to establish ‘an independent 
electricity authority to be run on a businesslike basis,’ as 
already demanded in the 1964 report (ibid: 33)—a goal of 
which the NEA has fallen short of meeting, in the opinion 
of most Nepalis with whom we have spoken. NEA oper-
ates as the owner of all transmission infrastructure and 
as the sole distributor of electricity to end consumers. 
Additionally, NEA generates approximately two-thirds of 
the country’s hydropower.
Since 1990, the private sector (also referred to as ‘inde-
pendent power producers’) has been allowed to construct 
hydropower projects, but this sector must negotiate power 
purchasing agreements with the NEA. This mandatory 
arrangement has been the long-standing focal point of 
conflict between the NEA, the private sector, and indi-
vidual electricity consumers. The NEA has developed a 
reputation as one of the most dysfunctional institutions 
in a country without a shortage of badly managed govern-
ment offices, and has consistently run at a loss in terms of 
revenue: a condition they blame on the weak Nepali rupee, 
but which the public and many development agencies 
blame on workplace inefficiencies, a bloated workforce 
backed by a powerful and inflexible union, and blatant 
corruption. Recent investigative journalism inquires have 
revealed that significant blame for the last decade of 
load-shedding in Nepal was due to NEA officials selling and 
redistributing electricity to industrial consumers illegally 
in exchange for lucrative kick-backs (Sangraula 2017).
However, despite these complicating issues, post-earth-
quake multi-national financing has begun to flow into 
the country. In fall 2016, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC)—the private sector arm of the World 
Bank—announced its intention to increase its portfolio 
in Nepal from its original pledge of $500 million in 2014. 
IFC’s country director for Nepal, Wendy Werner, said the 
investments, particularly in hydropower, would bring 
qualitative change to Nepal’s economy and way of life. 
Similarly, other multi-national organizations, such as the 
Italian-Thai Development Corporation (a stakeholder in 
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the planned Upper Karnali hydroelectric project), the 
China-based Sino Hydro corporation, as well as Indian 
developers SJVN and GMR, have looked to invest in Nepali 
hydropower. Despite the lack of specific data on all of 
these new actors, we did not find a different approach 
towards seismicity when compared with local industry 
representatives, in our numerous conversations with some 
of these multi-national actors.
These concerns and struggles voiced by the private sector 
belie the fact that, as far as hydropower development is 
concerned, the current moment is indeed a crucial one 
for them. Growing disdain and impatience for govern-
ment ineptitude and public perceptions of its rent-seeking 
behavior have placed significant political intentions and 
support behind private interests and companies in order to 
lead Nepali development in this century. For this reason, 
understanding the private sector’s view of seismicity is 
crucial because it holds significant favor and influence in 
determining the manner and scope of debates about both 
hydropower and development more generally. In today’s 
discussions about what constitutes ‘risk,’ the private sector 
is establishing a worldview in which risk is not about 
natural factors, but is rather about economic ones, over 
which they spin an illusion of control and management.
Our argument begins from a premise that society shapes 
patterns of perception, memory, and organizational 
aspects of thinking. In this context, we ask how people 
cope with information that is available. Like so many 
people around the world who are now well-versed in the 
reality and potential effects of climate change, hydropower 
professionals’ and government officials’ actions seldom 
reflect what the scientific community has long known 
about the Himalayas: it is a relatively young geologic area, 
exceptionally prone to seismic activity (Champati ray et al. 
2006; Khattri 1987; Kumar Nath 2004). These geologic quali-
ties, then, should be reflected in national discourse around 
hydropower, which calls for extreme and transformative 
impositions of infrastructure into such natural landscapes. 
And yet, our research and experience show it was not.
At the core of this discussion is a consideration of both risk 
and uncertainty, as well as of the competing definitions 
and interpretations of risk. We are not the first to ask 
these questions. In their updated volume, Thompson et al. 
(2007) note that a dearth of solid research about Nepal’s 
environmental problems had manifested itself as a milieu 
of uncertainty regarding how the country could address its 
ecological challenges. On one hand, no one doubted that 
forests were being over-harvested for timber; aerial pho-
tographs could show completely denuded hillsides. But, 
how much over-harvesting had taken place, and by what 
percentage? And how much replanting and time would 
these hillsides need to recover? The absence of these facts 
thwarted action on the part of Nepali institutions.
With respect to hydropower, we focus on how uncer-
tainty is, or is not, expressed in terms of risk. Our research 
suggests that the private hydropower sector and related 
development agencies are giving more and more weight to 
a rationalized view of risk, much along the lines of Ulrich 
Beck’s view of risk, which focuses on what can be mea-
sured, as opposed to what should be measured (2006). This 
view contrasts starkly with the perception of local resi-
dents living around future and present hydropower sites. 
Following Arjun Appadurai (2011) we argue that directly 
affected people are not actually dealing with risk, but 
extreme uncertainty about the future of their lives, homes, 
and livelihoods—far beyond their access to electricity. 
Whereas professionals use models to project the structural 
integrity of dams and potential earnings from electricity 
sales, the people living in close proximity to hydropower 
projects have no way to calculate and manage the ‘risks’ 
that these interventions will mean on the ground.
Socially Organized Denial
The slow government response to the 2015 earthquake in 
Nepal threatens to exacerbate social inequality, alter com-
munity structures, and generate new patterns of economic 
and social conflict. How is it that this major catastrophic 
event has failed to cause a strong response from the hydro-
power industry? What can explain the disjuncture between 
lived experience and public concern? What can we say 
about the prevailing opinions about seismicity that existed 
prior to the 2015 earthquake and continue to neutralize 
or muffle a stronger outcry for stricter regulations on 
hydropower development? To discuss this issue, we engage 
what Eviatar Zerubavel calls ‘socially organized denial’ 
regarding the risks of hydropower in a seismically active 
area (2002). Conventional thinking suggests that if people 
understood the threat of earthquakes in the Himalayan 
region, they would change their thinking about matters 
such as hydropower, just as we would expect that people 
would take more substantial initiatives to fight climate 
change once the scientific evidence reached the level of 
preponderance. And yet, this is not the case.
The concept of socially organized denial traverses the 
fields of psychology and sociology to investigate “the 
mental processes of attending and ignoring” (Zerubavel 
1997: 11) in “response to social circumstances, and carried 
out through a process of social interaction” (Norgaard 
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2006: 352). While much of this work has focused on human 
enormities (Cohen 2001) and political apathy (Eliasoph 
1998), we are joining a conversation with Norgaard who 
has used cognitive sociology to investigate and interpret 
the various means by which Norwegians, among others, 
have resisted to engage with climate change initiatives in 
the face of mounting evidence and impacts (2011).
Socially organized denial is context-specific, informed 
and shaped by the culture(s) in which it forms. Individuals 
negotiate prevailing ideologies and engage in identifiable 
patterns of rhetoric, which we can analyze in order to 
delineate the boundaries within which the debate over a 
particular issue is confined. As we will see in our exam-
ples to follow, debates about seismicity and hydropower 
are strictly limited within a narrative in which Nepal’s 
future and hopes are inextricably tied to its success in 
hydropower development. Therefore, discussions that 
stray too far from this central argument tend to be few 
and unexpressed.
Various groups within a debate, which occupy distinct 
positions of power, have unequal access to move discus-
sions toward their guiding points of reference. Sutton and 
Norgaard (2013) were correct to connect this element of 
organized denial to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (1971), 
that dominant groups maintain their positions culturally 
by securing collective consent to their ideas. This discus-
sion suggests that while hegemonic discourses are cultural 
processes bound by perception, many forms of denial are 
produced (and contested). Culturally prescribed norms 
about how to think (or not think) about things reflect a 
particularly insidious form of social control.
If socially organized denial is shaped in response to social 
circumstance, Nepali hydropower’s version of denial 
would be defined by the country’s long-standing and 
frustrating attempts at development. Numerous scholars 
have documented the deeply engrained nature of develop-
ment in Nepal (cf. Pigg 1993; Shrestha 1997), wherein being 
developed (‘bikasi’ in Nepali) or not developed (‘abikasit’ 
in Nepali) prevails as a fundamental distinction between 
urban and rural populations, and between those who are 
‘modern’ and those who are not. This frustration is further 
compounded by an unstable and unproductive govern-
ment which has, as of this writing, re-formed 26 times 
since the democratic revolution in 1990, each new itera-
tion bringing in a new roster of ministers and visions to 
lead the country who are ultimately unable to succeed.
No country can improve its economic standing and the 
livelihoods of its residents without a stable and reliable 
source of energy (Barnes and Floor 1996; Lee 2005). In this 
context, Nepal’s weak economy has opened space for the 
private sector to state its case for leading development, 
arguing that state-led and donation-backed programs have 
failed to make appreciable returns for the average Nepali. 
The hydropower sector has seized this moment to fight for 
decreasing regulation of their industry, suggesting that for 
every day that passes, every drop of water that cascades 
from the mountains without passing a turbine represents 
lost revenue and opportunity for the country. Both the 
Nepalese state and the hydropower industry only see 
‘falling water’ (Gyawali 2003). By this standard, expediting 
hydro development and downplaying the inherent risks 
makes ‘sense.’
Risk and Uncertainty
In his essay, ‘The Cultural Nature of Risk,’ Åsa Boholm 
rhetorically asks what social anthropologists can contrib-
ute to risk research. His answer is: context (2003: 174). He 
roots his conclusion in a discussion of Mary Douglas and 
Ulrich Beck, who differ in how they regard the need for 
an analytic distinction between traditional and modern 
models of risk. For Douglas and other cultural theorists, 
Boholm writes, “explanations in terms of ‘risk’ in modern 
society are understood to fulfil the same social function as 
explanations in terms of destiny, supernatural agency, or 
broken taboo in traditional societies” (2003: 165). In other 
words, for cultural theorists, risk, like taboos, is subjec-
tively chosen and culturally constructed to exert social 
control over a population, thus eliminating the need to 
analytically separate the concept of ‘risk’ from the concept 
of ‘taboo.’
Beck, by contrast, posits risk as a new element that per-
meates all modern interactions and discourse, the product 
of an economic system that attempts to simultaneously 
instantiate and mystify risk through de-contextualized 
calculations and rational decision-making models (1992). 
In this way, risk appears ‘objective.’ He defines risk as 
“phenomena and causality in the natural world that can 
have harmful effects” (Boholm 2003: 161). This ‘objective’ 
and modern notion of risk differs from the cultural theory 
turn in the sense that it stands apart from society in the 
realm of mathematics, unlike the notion of taboo, which 
grounds itself in the community and its behaviors.
Boholm seeks a middle ground when it comes to analyz-
ing risk—a ground in which we root our analysis. To call 
something a ‘risk’ implies values and subjective judgment, 
and yet, determining probability of events and occur-
rences through statistics has a largely accepted predictive 
ability. The power of numbers and rational models can 
illuminate optimum paths devoid of human errors in judg-
ment. However, history is rife with examples of people and 
institutions choosing otherwise. The 2008 global recession, 
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triggered by the collapse of the American housing market, 
is perhaps one of the best examples of this incongruity: 
trillions of dollars were lost due to a subjective belief 
that housing values would always rise, when, in fact, 
a closer look at the details showed collapse was immi-
nent (Lewis 2011).
With respect to the Nepal earthquake, a subjective defi-
nition of risk might attend to how hillsides are utilized, 
occupied, and maintained. This could affect settlement 
patterns as populations move to higher ground to avoid 
earthquake-induced landslides, such as those in Langtang 
and Gorkha which obliterated several villages (Pokhrel 
2015). In rural areas such as these, natural disasters have 
often been explained as angry divine responses to trans-
gressional human behavior. On the Sunkoshi River in 2014, 
150 people were killed in a landslide that several residents 
attributed to misbehavior at a local naga, or serpent spirit, 
shrine (Personal communication Weena Pun, 15 August 
2014). The 2015 Everest avalanche triggered by a falling 
serac was interpreted by many as divine retribution to 
the increasing mass tourism that was despoiling relations 
between human and more-than-human entities (Personal 
communication, Ben Ayers, 22 February 2016; see also 
GlacierHub 2015). In line with our broader argument, these 
explanations show that for people facing living conditions 
shaped by deep uncertainties and a severe lack of reliable 
scientific data, calculating (or even estimating) risk in 
these terms is not a strategy they apply widely.
An objective interpretation of risk would calculate the 
time since the last earthquake, seismometric readings of 
vibrations in the earth’s crust, and measurements of the 
levels of escaping radon gas. In spite of these preferred 
optics with which to gauge potential earthquakes, the sci-
entific community has no illusions about its ability: “The 
USGS [United States Geological Survey] nor any scientist 
have ever predicted a major earthquake. They do not know 
how, and they do not expect to know in the foreseeable 
future” (USGS 2016). Curiously, however, the USGS goes on 
to say, “Based on scientific data, probabilities can be cal-
culated for potential future earthquakes” (ibid). And this 
is a key admission. While no one can predict earthquakes, 
we operate and build in a world where probabilities and 
speculation are used to determine levels of risk.
Thus, in our study of socially organized denial, the 
definition of risk in Nepal appears to be a site of contes-
tation—much like the battles over taste (Bourdieu 1984), 
official knowledge (Dove 2006), and scientific standards 
(Latour 1993). What will be the hegemonic view of risk 
in Nepal’s infrastructural development? Our research 
suggests that the increasing rise of the private sector is 
shifting its views of risk away from being subjective and 
culturally-determined, and towards an understanding of 
risk as objectively calculable. This process is aided and 
abetted by the private financial interests and development 
agencies that fund hydropower projects.
Much of the risk research today tends to focus on capi-
talism and the financial mechanisms that are spawned 
to create value amidst rules and regulations that seek to 
limit fraud and excessive gain. Though seemingly a far-cry 
from the topic of earthquakes and hydropower, it is the 
general orientation of financiers and their reliance on 
models, predictability, and the data they choose to analyze 
that draw our interest. The highly-rational form of risk 
assessment that we witness in Nepali hydropower seems to 
reflect an ascendance of financial institutions worldwide, 
generally: to define risk, to suggest means for hedging risk, 
and to determine how much risk the individual is respon-
sible for vis-à-vis other individuals and/or corporations. 
Like finance, we need to inspect the legitimating principles 
guiding hydropower construction in Nepal. As the 2015 
earthquake reminds us, it appears the ‘techniques of calcu-
lability…have far exceeded the organizations and tools for 
its management, hence opening a new distance between 
expert and popular understandings of risk (Appadurai 
2011: 528). The ethos of hydropower professionals working 
in Nepal, those who play and shape the game, perpetuates 
a process that is ‘simultaneously discursive, technical, 
institutional, and ideological’ (ibid: 526), by which they 
attempt to push uncertainty out of the picture, albeit not 
entirely successfully.
Appearances and Spectacular Accumulation
Socially organized denial has a specific context and tem-
porality in which it emerges to influence public thinking 
about earthquakes, hydropower, and risk. But there is 
more going on here than simple denial. At this particular 
historical moment, as Nepal searches for development and 
electricity, it is not enough that the hydro industry simply 
goes about its work. It needs to sell a vision, a future, not 
just for the average Nepali, but, more importantly, for 
the finance needed to build these projects, and for the 
government to help create more favorable conditions for 
completing this work.
Private hydropower interests advance this vision through 
a series of tropes about water as national destiny, hydro-
power as development, and the fulfillment of democratic 
promise. To be successful, private hydropower has to 
present a confident image of certain profit in order to 
realize itself through foreign investment—whether from 
private firms or development banks. They engage in what 
Tsing calls the ‘economy of appearances.’ Promoting 
hydropower as profitable and its associated risk as cal-
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culable is a “conjuring trick, a drama… a self-conscious 
making of… spectacle [as] a necessary aid to gathering 
investment funds” (Tsing 2000: 118). When you trace out 
the string of people who desire hydropower to arrive as a 
business, who want certain returns, who want discussions 
of risk circumscribed to the topic of guaranteeing profit, 
you can understand how they could be convinced to deny 
serious credence to possible earthquakes. It doesn’t fit 
the narrative.
The private hydropower narrative sells images of illu-
minated rural homes, children studying late into the 
evenings under lamps, social programs sprouting up from 
fully-filled government coffers, and urban homes stocked 
with modern appliances, surging to life, at any time of day, 
with the press of a button. Nature must be ‘made into loot,’ 
and Nepal is told it’s not water but money that pours down 
its rivers, unrealized and wasted. This conjuring trick has 
its roots in notions of frontier culture, asking participants 
to see a landscape that doesn’t yet exist, the same way that 
the US gold rush invited white immigrants to envision the 
American West. It is reminiscent of Georg Simmel’s (2011: 
482) insight about the monetization of value: “Gauging 
values in terms of money has taught us to determine and 
specify values down to the last farthing…The ideal of 
numerical calculability has been made possible in practi-
cal, and perhaps even in intellectual, life only through the 
money economy.”
These private sector machinations in support of finance 
are possible due to a prevailing national discipline that 
says development is necessary, and the government has 
failed in its responsibility do deliver development. This 
argument effectively produces a political quietude that 
does not question risk and dismisses protest as the work of 
rogue individuals rather than legitimate groups (Adhikari 
2011), which then enables the state to draw in military 
suppression of future protests without much comment 
from the public. Hydropower becomes a tool of what Tsing 
refers to as ‘spectacular accumulation,’ a means of creat-
ing ‘value’ through speculation and spectacle, and often 
at great cost to those who would reap none of the profits. 
Investors are “looking for the appearance of success. They 
cannot afford to find out if a product is solid,” or free 
from risks such as earthquakes (Tsing 2000: 141). To meet 
this demand from the market, hydro developers must sell 
potential, not product. And uncertainty cannot be enter-
tained within this model.
Conclusion
As Nepal develops and becomes a ‘global nation,’ it 
needs to be noted that this term connotes an opening up 
process in which new areas submit to foreign investment, 
first and foremost the hydropower sector. In order to 
attract foreign capital, hydropower developers engage in 
complex calculations of the risk involved in these projects. 
However, such risk calculations may be entirely beside 
the point if earthquakes cannot be accurately predicted. 
Based on our interviews, the main datasets included in 
these risk analyses focus on the development of electricity 
production and consumption tariffs, which are combined 
with assessments of the political developments in India 
and China. At the moment, we sense an extreme amount 
of urgency to bring the proposed and long delayed large-
scale projects on track (and eventually on line) before the 
Indian government follows through with its announce-
ments to substantially increase its solar and nuclear power 
generation. This would effectively erase Nepal’s ability to 
profit from the harvest of hydropower, and would dismiss 
the electricity-export-driven development model Nepalese 
elites have been working on for decades.
Most importantly, though, these risk analysis models 
exclude those factors that cannot be calculated: reduced 
water flow and the increased danger of glacial lake 
outburst floods due to climate change, and the threat of 
future earthquakes. If discussed, these natural events are 
conceptualized like financial risks, that is, risks that can 
be managed through calculation. But the seismic risk to 
a potential hydropower site simply cannot be calculated. 
What we are actually talking about, then, is uncertainty. 
As Appadurai (2011: 524) reminds us, “uncertainty remains 
outside of all financial devices and models.”
The denial of uncertainty serves an important purpose 
in maintaining the promise of Nepal as a future ‘hydro-
power nation’ (Lord 2014). As with many other financial 
devices, it helps to obscure the fact that those who make 
a living with the financialization of risk are seldom those 
who have to live with the uncertainties produced by its 
ramifications. In the case of hydropower development in 
Nepal, the affected communities have always already been 
among the most vulnerable: predominantly peasants who 
subsistence-farm in geologically highly unstable moun-
tains. Many of these families are indigenous, and already 
contend with institutionalized forms of discrimination that 
inhibit their ability to provide for themselves.
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In other words, we suggest that the private sector is poised 
to exploit what Frickel and Vincent (2011) call ‘undone 
science,’ places where horizontal and vertical knowl-
edge gaps intersect, leaving a void wherein uncertainty 
about environmental issues can be amplified or denied 
for political gain. In post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans, 
some parishes had extensive soil sampling for contami-
nation while other areas were neglected. When activists 
complained, the US Environmental Protection Agency 
deepened their testing, but did not expand it to those 
neglected areas. In this way, the scientific community 
learned more information about fewer locations, which did 
not necessarily improve the level of knowledge overall. In 
a similar fashion, the lack of seismic knowledge as it relates 
to hydropower construction provides another opening 
in which the private sector can advance its position—by 
claiming the importance of thorough studies on safety and 
environmental impact—without actually knowing whether 
the structures it designs will be prepared to withstand a 
major earthquake. On the other hand, civil society and 
anti-dam activists cannot marshal an opposition to dam 
construction in seismic zones beyond supposition. That 
is, having little evidence for their position, they can only 
warn about the danger of dam breach as a possibility 
rather than a likelihood. In Nepal’s energy-starved, devel-
opment-seeking context, theirs is indeed a weak position.
Through local employment, electrification, improved 
infrastructural access, and possible local social devel-
opment, hydropower projects may open up exciting 
potentialities for local communities. Recent project devel-
opment agreements, such as the one for the Upper Karnali 
Hydroelectric Project, have the availability of shares for 
affected people written into the terms of the contract. In 
some parts of Nepal, share options in hydro projects have 
attracted high levels of interest from local small-scale 
investors (ShareSansar 2016).
But, communities around these proposed dam sites will 
also have to live with the increased uncertainties these 
projects will bring to their villages. Generations of rural 
communities have been taught that the village is a back-
ward place and that the Nepalese state will change those 
conditions (Pigg 1992). Perhaps it is not surprising, then, to 
note that it was predominantly old women who expressed 
negative feelings about the imminent hydropower boom 
in the Arun valley (Rest 2012). Whether the 2015 earth-
quakes will change the discourse on risk and uncertainty 
on the Nepalese hydropower frontier remains to be seen. 
In line with Boholm’s proposition, we are convinced that 
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